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RESPECT FOR "FORM"

It would be difficult to imagine how the federal tax system of
the United States could function without the "substance-overEvery analysis of the tax treatment of a
form" principle.
transaction or transfer must, explicitly or implicitly, address the
question: "Will the tax law treat this as what it appears to be?"
The question of whether the tax rules will be applied according to
the "form" or the "substance" of the transaction or transfer has
taken on a variety of formulations in the judicial decisions.
A. Is this in Fact a "Sham"?

First, there is the category of cases where the taxpayer's
version of events is documented but inconsistent with what
actually occurred. The documents were not respected. A change
in title was recorded in the name of the new owner but control
over and enjoyment of the property never changed hands.
Income and expense were recorded on the books of a trust but
the trustee served in fact as a mere nominee. Property was
leased, but only on paper. The transaction or transfer was a
"fake." In effect, the form was not respected by the taxpayer.
B. Is this a "Sham"in Substance?
The next category of cases is much' more difficult to
categorize. That is unfortunate because they represent the core
learning and experience in the application of "substance" over
form. While there are a variety of formulations of the appropriate
test in these cases, the inquiry always focuses on the lack of an
economic dimension to the taxpayer's position. For example, in
the leading case of Knetsch v. United States,' dealing with a tax
shelter investment, the transaction (a leveraged investment in
deferred income bonds) was treated as a "sham" because "there
was. nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this
transaction beyond a tax deduction." On the Court's reading of
the facts, the taxpayer had no credible chance for an economic
profit from the investment measured on a pre-tax basis. Some of
these cases blend over into the first category: the steps on which
the taxpayer relies actually occurred, but the events involve other
steps that limit or offset the resulting economic consequences, so

that the taxpayer's

1.

change in economic position is not

34 U.S. 261, 266 (1960).
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meaningful. 2 If a taxpayer claims that his transfer of property to

a trust for the benefit of his child is not a gift but a sale, is there
any difference between the case where the taxpayer never
intended to collect the purchase price (a sham in fact) and the
case where the taxpayer loaned the purchase money to the trust
on terms that evidenced it would never be paid back (a sham in

substance)? 3
C. Was this what Congress Intended?

The Court may also conclude that the actual events are
outside the Congressional intent of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) provision on which the taxpayer relies. In the leading case
of Gregory v. Helvering,4 Justice Sutherland conceded that the
taxpayer was legally entitled "to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means
which the law permits." However, he concluded that the real
question was "whether what was done, apart from the tax motive,
was the thing which the statute intended," and decided the case
against the taxpayer.,
Indeed, it should be inevitable that

questions of "substance" over "form" require an analysis of
statutory intent whenever the transaction or transfer is not a
sham in fact (not a "fake"), and the challenge is made on the
ground that the taxpayer's position has no substance apart from
tax consequences. Assuming that a particular transaction or
investment has some economic substance apart from tax
consequences (e.g., the pre-tax profit potential is not de
minimus), then it has a non-tax purpose and the question of
statutory intent should become paramount. Otherwise, the
substance over form doctrine would greatly circumscribe the
Congressional prerogative to allow transactions to be taxed
according to their form, and to encourage the form 6to be
deliberately structured to take advantage of a tax incentive.
More specifically, in applying "substance over form" to bona
fide transactions or transfers (not a "sham" in fact), the
perplexing but critical question is "how much substance is
enough?" That question cannot be answered without an
2.
See Rev. Rul. 86-106, 1986-2 C.B. 28, 29 (citing and discussing the
following cases: Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Deputy v. duPont,
308 U.S. 488 (1940); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 62 (2nd Cir.
1938); Perrett v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 111 (1980)).
3.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-264, 1981-2 C.B. 186.
4.
293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
5.
Id. at 469.
6.
See BoRIs I. BITrTER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
EsTATE AND GIFrS 4-43 to 4-45 (1989); Kenneth W. Gideon, Mrs. Gregory's
GrandchildrernJudicialRestrictionof Tax Shelters, 5 VA. TAX. Rsv. 825, 847 (1986).
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examination of legislative intent. The relevance of Congressional

intent is obvious in "tax shelter" cases where Congress created an

7
incentive and the taxpayer is allegedly "abusing" that privilege.
Those cases have generally concluded that, in addition to meeting
the literal requirements of the statute, Congress must have
assumed that the taxpayer's activity, such as borrowing money,
also had some economic purpose apart from tax consequences. 8
This approach actually developed initially outside of the tax
shelter context. Most notably, in Gregory v. Commissioner,9 the
Tax Court began by concluding that the "meticulously drafted"
statutory provision on corporate reorganizations left no room for a
judicial gloss. However, the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court concluded quite the opposite: that a transaction lacking a
"business purpose" could not have been intended by Congress as
a "corporate reorganization." Though the results of this analysis
vary from case to case, and from opinion to opinion, the
important point is that this formulation of the doctrine claims
Congressional intent as its rationale. Thus, the courts should
recognize that its application should adapt to the particular
statutory question involved.

D. Are We Seeing the Whole Picture
(the 'Step Transaction"Doctrine)?
Though conceptualized as a separate doctrine, the "step
transaction" doctrine largely overlaps with the "substance over
form" doctrine. It might be considered, in large part, a variation
on "substance over form" in that it deals with whether the form of
the taxpayer's ordering of events will be respected. Will steps be
added to or subtracted from the course of events described by the
taxpayer, or will the steps be reordered, to show the "true

picture?" Courts have used the step transaction doctrine to link
prearranged or contemplated steps, despite a party's lack of a
legal obligation or financial compulsion to complete all the steps
in the transaction.' 0 Should every step be respected, however
transitory or lacking in substance? The step transaction doctrine
has been employed to eliminate transitory or unnecessary steps

7.
See, e.g., Bryant v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 745, 749 (6th Cir. 1991);
Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).
8.
See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA) 97, 115,
affid in part and rev'd in part; 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); Goldstein v.
Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005
(1967).
9.
27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932), rev'd, Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809,
811 (2nd Cir. 1934).
10.
See King Enters. v. U.S., 418 F.2d 511, 516-17 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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where the steps taken were "so interdependent that the legal
relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless
without a completion of the series."1 1
II. "FORM" AS "SUBSTANCE"
Against this persistent belief in the sanctity of substance lies
the reality that the operation of the tax law is dependent upon
form. Taxpayers often choose among forms based on tax
consequences, because different forms are treated differently by
the tax law. Moreover, different forms are rarely completely
identical in substance. Consequently, questions of degree arise
in deciding whether the two forms are "similar enough" to be
taxed the same way. For these reasons, form becomes substance
in many cases. A Code provision contemplates a form of
transaction or transfer and treats it a certain way by reason of a
certain legislative policy on such matters. If a particular form
then seems to vary from the norm, the question arises: "Is this
what Congress intended?" A decision must be made as to
whether the variance in form is material or immaterial in view of
the substantive purpose. How often this question arises depends
on the ingenuity of taxpayers, the context involved, and most
importantly, how closely the form contemplated by the Code
provision matches the legislative purpose.
A. Taxation of GratuitousTransfers by Nonresidents
of the United States
The importance of form is readily illustrated in the field of
U.S. taxation of international trusts and their settlors and
beneficiaries. The tax rules for nonresidents of the United States
depend heavily on distinctions based on form. A simple example
will illustrate this reliance on form, and how form reflects
substance. This example deals with transfer taxation of
nonresidents. While the estate, gift and generation-skipping tax
impose taxation based on legal rights to property, which are
naturally matters of form, the following discussion will consider
how even simple rules of form might be open to challenge in
cases where another result seems to have a more substantive
foundation. Even so, the simple rules of form generally prevail.
Although the U.S. estate and gift tax is imposed on
gratuitous transfers by U.S. citizens and residents regardless of
the location of the property, such transfers by a non-resident

11.

Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1032, 1042 (1957).
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citizen (NRA) are not subject to tax if the property is considered
situated outside the United States. 12 Accordingly, it has become
standard practice for NRAs who are purchasing U.S. situs
property to effect the purchase through a non-U.S. corporation.' 3
Is there reason to doubt the logical integrity of a system in which

the U.S. estate tax applies upon the death of a non-U.S. investor
to direct stockholdings in the U.S. equity market but not to the
same stocks that are the sole asset of a non-U.S. company wholly
owned by the same investor? It is not necessary to challenge this
structure in order to defend the integrity of the system, if respect
for form is an important principle that promotes consistency and
ease of application both for the investor and the U.S. tax
authorities.
Congress has acknowledged the viability of avoiding U.S.
estate tax by the use of a non-U.S. investment company. The
legislative history of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966
contains this instructive passage describing the opportunity for a
newly-minted NRA, having lost U.S. citizenship and residency, to
avoid U.S. estate tax on U.S. situs property:
In determining the value of the gross estate of such an expatriate
(as in the case of nonresident aliens generally) only property
situated in the United States that was owned by him at the time of
his death is included. However, the U.S. estate tax base of these
expatriate decedents is expanded in certain respects to prevent him
from avoiding U.S. tax on his estate by transferring assets with a
U.S. situs to a foreign corporation in exchange for its stock. Such a
transfer by a nonresident alien would reduce the portion of his
gross estate having a U.S. situs, since the stock of a foreign
corporation has a foreign situs even though the assets of the
foreign corporation are situated in the United States. 14

At that time, a new set of anti-avoidance rules was adopted for such
expatriates, but in the process the ability of other NRAs to use the
form of an investment company to avoid U.S. estate tax was
expressly recognized. When these expatriation rules in section
2107 (and the parallel income tax rule in section 877) were again
addressed by Congress some thirty years later, the legislative
history of the Code amendments in 1996 further conceded the
effectiveness of the non-U.S. corporation for investors who are not

former U.S. citizens. Indeed, one of the primary changes made was
to amend the income tax rules to prevent a new expatriate from
transferring appreciated U.S. situs property tax-free to a controlled
non-U.S. corporation because that transfer allowed the corporation

12.

See I.R.C. §§ 2103, 2511(a) (1986).

13.

See WILLIAM H. NEWTON, III, INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX AND EsTATE

PLANNING § 4.64 (2d ed. 1993).
14.
S. REP. No. 98-1707, at 54 (1966).
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to sell the U.S. property free of U.S. tax and invest in non-U.S.
property.' s Thus, the expatriate could end up owning a non-U.S.
corporation with non-U.S. assets, and avoid the estate tax rule
enacted earlier in 1966.16
Form is also important in the application of U.S. gift taxes to
NRAs. While under the situs rule, stock in a U.S. company is
considered situated in the U.S., the gift tax for lifetime transfers
does not apply to a transfer of intangible property by an NRAregardless of the situs of the property gifted. 17 As a result, a
lifetime gift by an NRA is subject to U.S. gift tax only if the subject
of the gift is real property, or tangible personal property, located
in the U.S. Thus, U.S. real property cannot be gifted completely
free of the gift tax, but shares in a U.S. real property holding
company can readily escape the gift tax, though not the estate
tax. This distinction that specially protects lifetime gifts of
intangibles was enacted by Congress, also in 1966, in recognition
of the difficulty of enforcing a contrary result.' 8 The point was
not to encourage gifts of intangibles but rather to carve out an
exception for gifts that would be too difficult for the Internal
Revenue Service to find and tax in any event. Apparently, the
dragnet of U.S. tax enforcement was considered formidable
enough to snare stock of a U.S. company at the death of the NRA
owner, but not if the NRA gifted it during life.
These rules of form are not always so benign. Certain
anomalies crop up through the legislative process. Transfer taxes
for an NRA, as we have seen, do not apply to lifetime gifts of
stock, nor to the transfers at death of stock in a non-U.S.
company. However, suppose that an NRA makes a lifetime
transfer of U.S. stock into a trust with a retained interest of the
kind that would subject the trust property to estate tax under
sections 2036, 2037, 2038, or 2039. Suppose further that the
U.S. stock is later exchanged for stock in a non-U.S. company,
prior to death. In that event, the non-U.S. stock in the retained
interest trust will be subject to estate tax because it is
attributable to an earlier transfer to the trust of U.S. situs
property, such as stock in a U.S. corporation. In other words, if
property is gifted during life with a retained interest, the property
is subject to estate tax if it was U.S. situs property at either the
time of death or the time of the gift.'

9

Furthermore, this

15.
See I.R.C. § 877(d)(2).
16.
H.R. REP. No. 104-496, at 148-49 (1996); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 104TH CONG., REPORT ON ISSUES PRESENTED BY PROPOSALS TO MODIFY THE
TAX TREATMENT OF EXPATRIATION 30 (June 1, 1995).
17.
See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(2).
18.
See S. REP. No. 98-1707, supranote 14, at 57.
19.
See I.R.C. § 2104(b).
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statutory rule has literally no limit on the lapse of time between
the initial transfer and the date of death. 20 This situs test seems
to run counter to other principles just discussed that exempt (1)
lifetime gifts of all intangibles by NRAs from U.S. gift tax, and (2)
outright ownership at a NRA's death of non-U.S. situs property
from the U.S. estate tax. The situs test for retained interest gifts

seems logical when applied to a gift of tangible U.S. situs property
such as real estate. But it is hard to rationalize why a total gift of
U.S. stock is not subject to tax and total ownership at death of
non-U.S. stock is not subject to tax, but an imperfect gift of U.S.
stock leading to incomplete ownership at death of non-U.S. stock
is then subject to tax. The anomaly originated in 1966 when the
situs test for retained interest gifts by NRAs was not amended to
conform with the enactment of the exemption for all gifts of
intangible property regardless of situs.
Such an occasional anomaly seems to reinforce the
importance of rules of form in the U.S. estate and gift tax system.
These rules reflect, for example, the substantive principle that
transfers at death of U.S. situs property are sufficiently connected
to the United States to justify and allow, as a practical matter, the
imposition of a transfer tax. This is a good example of how the
rules of form embody a substantive principle-form is substance.
The substantive importance of using situs as a foundation for
transfer taxation was amply demonstrated by the ill-advised and
unsuccessful departure from this approach in 1992 when the
U.S. tax authorities initially considered applying the U.S.
generation-skipping tax to transfers by NRAs of non-U.S. situs
property in certain cases. The proposal intended to apply the
generation-skipping tax to a transfer by an NRA if there were U.S.
persons ineach of two generations below the NRA transferor, that
is, (1) a U.S. person who was a permissible beneficiary of the
transferred property and (2) an ancestor of that beneficiary who
was also a lineal descendant of the NRA and who thus appeared
to be a "skipped" person.2 1
This proposed regulation was
severely criticized, and eventually replaced by a situs-based rule

that parallels the estate and gift tax rules.2 2 At least part of the
criticism was that the rule lacked realistic boundaries for the
imposition of taxation. 23 Since the proposal did not respect the

20.
See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9507044 (May 31, 1994) (original transfer in 1923
while U.S. citizen; death in 1991, after grantor's expatriation).
21.
See Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax, 57 Fed. Reg. 61353, 61371
(1992) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 26) (proposed Dec. 24, 1992).
22.
See id. § 26.2663-62.
23.
See, e.g., COMM. ON ESTATES AND TRUSTS, TAX SECTION, NEW YORK STATE
BAR Ass'N, REPORT ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE GENERATION-SKIPPING

TRANSFER TA 41 (1993).
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situs concept, it was easy to see that the proposed regulation

would be very difficult to interpret and enforce, as illustrated by
the following examples:
Example 1:

An NRA grandfather establishes an irrevocable
discretionary trust for the primary benefit of his
Canadian son. As is common with British
offshore trusts, the class of discretionary
beneficiaries also includes the NRA's other
descendants, including a U.S. daughter and her
U.S. children. The Trustee has the discretion to
allocate among this entire class, but is generally
guided by a Letter of Wishes that requests the
Trustee to provide for the Canadian son and his
family, and only if none of these persons is living,
then to provide for the U.S. daughter and her
family. The son and daughter later die and the
trust is then held under its terms for the
discretionary benefit of the NRA's grandchildren,
some of whom are U.S. persons. Under the
proposed regulations, an interest in property
would have been deemed to pass to the U.S.
grandchildren, and the death of the surviving
child would have been considered a taxable event
as to the whole of the trust, and the generationskipping tax would be imposed. The tax would
have applied to the entire trust even if no portion

of the trust is ever distributed to the U.S.
grandchildren because it was exhausted by the
needs of the Canadian grandchildren.
Example 2:

Assume that in Example 1 above the trust did
not authorize distributions to the U.S. family
directly, but one more of the Canadian
grandchildren had a limited power to appoint the
trust among the descendants of the original
transferor (other than the power holder). The
generation-skipping tax would still have applied
if the proposed regulations had been adopted,
since the U.S. grandchildren could receive
distributions pursuant to the exercise of this
power.

In such a system that follows form and reflects substance, it
is important to examine the form closely. This explains the result
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in Estate of Swan v. Commissioner,24 in which the court found
that assets held in two Stiftungs funded by the decedent were
within the decedent's gross estate under the retained interest rule
discussed above. Although the taxpayer claimed the entities
should be treated as non-U.S. corporations outside the scope of
the U.S. situs rule, the Tax Court's findings and analysis,
affirmed by the Second Circuit, concluded that the entities were
much more like private trusts and that the decedent could
withdraw funds from them on his sole signature. Thus, the
transfer of funds to the entities was a retained interest transfer.
While this appears to be a case in which "substance" triumphed
over "form," that does not mean that the examination of the form
is unhinged from the original forms contemplated by the statute.
To say that the statute depends upon respect for the form does
not mean that tax treatment turns on the mere labels applied by
the taxpayer. The form must reflect substance.
The recent case of Alumax Inc. v. Commissioner2s further

illustrates the point, although it involves a domestic corporate tax
issue. The question was whether a subsidiary could be properly
consolidated as a member of an affiliated group under section
1504(a) on the ground that the group held "at least eighty percent
of the voting power of all classes of stock" of the subsidiary. The
taxpayer asserted that the eighty percent test was met because
the right to elect eighty percent of the board of directors existed.
However, the court found that this supermajority of the board did
not have the customary powers to manage the corporation that
are usually associated with that block, so the eighty percent test
was not satisfied. It was more than a mechanical test, because
the purpose of the voting power test was intended to allow
consolidation where common management existed, not just literal
voting power. The form had to be examined closely. Reliance on
26
the labels used by the taxpayer was not enough.
24.

247 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1957).

25.

165 F.3d 822 (1Ith Cir. 1999), aff'g 109 T.C. 133 (1997).

26.
The same kind of examination, and re-examination of form, applies at
the legislative level. A striking example is the portfolio debt rules which allow
NRAs to invest in U.S. issued debt, free of income and transfer taxes. This
exemption was originally enacted in 1984 in recognition of the fact that
complicated offshore debt structures and tax treaty networks could accomplish
the same result. See I.R.C. § 871(h)(1); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, § 127(a) 98 Stat. 494, 648-49 (1984); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN.,
98TH CONG., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED
BY THE COMM. ON MAR. 21, 1984 416-21 (Comm. Print 1984). Later the statute was
amended to prevent investments in the form of debt from enjoying this privilege if
the return was contingent on the gross receipts, profits, etc., of the debtor, i.e., if
the debt took on the form of equity. See I.R.C. § 871(h)(4); Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13237(a)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 506-

07 (1993).
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B. "Step Transactions"in InternationalTrusts

1. Traditional Principles
This brings us to a further examination of the "step
transaction doctrine." This doctrine cuts across the entire Code
and appears to be less confined by the rigidities of form. It seems
more powerful because it appears to deal most frequently with
simply changing the order of the steps. Thus, it can generate
different potential outcomes while still respecting the legal rights
inherent in the initial structure and in the end result of a
transaction or transfer.
Transfers can be characterized in several ways when the
"step transaction" directive is applied to the taxation of trusts.
The re-characterization issue might be considered as subparts of
the ultimate question "who transferred what to where? " First of
all, there are a number of examples of "shams in factessentially "fake" transactions where nothing was actually
transferred to a trust by legitimate documentation or the
purported grantor was a mere pawn of someone else.2 7 Secondly,
there are the cases requiring closer analysis of who is the grantor.
The purported grantor may not have been a mere pawn, but
nevertheless was not the "true" grantor. 28 Thirdly, there are at
least a few cases in which the property transferred was recharacterized (the "what" in the above question).2 9 Finally, there
are cases in which a gratuitous transfer to one donee (the "where"
in the above question) may be re-characterized as a transfer to
someone else. For example, a gratuitous transfer to a corporation
is ordinarily treated as a transfer to its shareholders if the
30
transferor and the shareholders are related parties.
Even though the "step transaction" doctrine thus seems
elastic, it still has its limits. In large part, in order to change who
is the grantor or what property was transferred, the courts
require the Internal Revenue Service (Service) to demonstrate that
the transfer was conditional, i.e., that the "true" grantor

27.
See Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 779-81 (1972) (finding that
trusts were mere conduits); Rev. Rul. 80-74, 1980-1 C.B. 137.
28.
See MacManus v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 670, 673-74 (6th Cir. 1942);
Buhl v. Kavanaugh, 118 F.2d 315, 320-21 (6th Cir. 1941); Estate of Denzer v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 237, 242-44 (1957).
29.
See Byers v. commissioner, 199 F.2d 273, 275-76 (8th Cir. 1952);
Estate of Levin v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 723, 731-32 (1988); Rev. Rul. 81-54,
1981-1 C.B. 476, 476-77.
30.
See Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1956);
Estate of Hitchon v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 96, 102-04 (1965); Rev. Rul 74-329,

1974-2 C.B. 269; Rev. Rul. 71-443, 1971-2 C.B. 338.
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transferred something to the nominal grantor on the condition
that the nominal grantor effect another transfer. The principle
that emerges from these cases is that a person must exercise
"dominion and control" over the transfer in order to qualify as the
grantor.3 1 If Smith transfers to Jones on the condition that Jones
transfer to the trust, then Smith is the grantor. But, if Jones is
entitled to exercise dominion and control over the second
transfer, then Jones is the grantor. These cases do not always
require that the condition on the first transfer be legally binding,
but the mere showing of proximity in time between the two
transfers is not enough to show the requisite connection. Clearly,
there is a willingness in some cases to re-characterize the
transfer if there is an "understanding," which in some
circumstances may not be a legally enforceable condition, 3 2 but
this is more than a mere expectation of what will happen next. 33

Most notably, in Davies v. Commissioner," the Tax Court
required less than a legally binding commitment but more than a
mere expectation.3 s The court re-characterized a sale of U.S.
situs property as a part gift/part sale.3 6 The father sold the
property to his son, but the father had in fact gifted the cash
used by the son to pay both the initial down payment and the
later installment payments on the purchase money mortgage. The
court re-characterized the cash transfer used for the down
payment as a transfer of real estate because it was made on the
condition that it be used for that purpose, but it held that the
later transfers were simply gifts of cash because there was no
requirement that they be used to pay off the mortgage, just an
37
expectation.
2. Outer Limits: Situs Rules and Indirect Trust Distributions
Wherever the line is drawn between "understanding" and
"wishful thinking" in such cases, there is still more expected than
a proximity in time or a tracing of assets. Such more expansive

31.
See MacManus, 131 F.2d at 673-74; BuhI, 118 F.2d at 320-2 1; Estate of
Denzer, 29 T.C. at 242-44; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-016 (Aug. 5, 1993).
32.
See Blake v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 473, 478-80 (2d Cir. 1982).
33.
See Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 693-95 (1974), affid on other
grounds, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975) (corporation was not bound to redeem
shares given to private foundation with the expectation that they would be
redeemed). Cf.LeFrak v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (RIA) 2808, 2811-13 (1993)
(determining an asset's value based on property's value before a later transfer to a
partnership).
34.
40 T.C. 525, 531-32 (1963).

35.
36.
37.

See id.
See id.
See id.

1999]

RESPECTFOR aFORM" AS "SUBSTANCE"

rules have not been adopted by the courts. A rule based on
proximity in time or tracing of assets can, of course, be readily
adopted by Congress to address a perceived problem with a
bright line test,38 and this itself could be considered a use of
"form" to impose tax consequences. But it is much harder to
imagine such a form being adopted by a court or by regulation,
unless more clearly authorized by 'Congress in the first
instance.3 9 The form adopted must reflect substance, and not
arbitrary or broader standards for taxation than those laid down
by Congress.
For example, in 1992, the proposed generation-skipping tax
regulations contained a rule that would have expanded the
concept of a transfer of U.S. situs property by adopting an "antiabuse rule."4 ° Under this proposal, all steps shortly prior to or
promptly following a transfer of non-U.S. situs property could be
aggregated to show that the effect was to transfer U.S. situs
property, and the tax would then be applied as if U.S. situs
property were transferred. 4 1 This proposal was withdrawn after it
was severely criticized as inconsistent with the legislative scheme

for taxing only U.S. situs property as described above. 42 The
proposal may have grown out of frustration with the limits of the
step transaction doctrine in the context of gratuitous transfers.

38.
See, for example, I.R.C. § 679(a)(5) (1998) for situations in which the
grantor becomes a U.S. resident within five years of the transfer. In the
partnership context, see §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737(b)(1).
39.
Under § 707(a(2)(B), Congress authorized the Service to re-characterize
a transfer of property to a partnership and a later distribution of property or
money by the partnership as a disguised sale or exchange. The regulations
adopted a fairly sophisticated test of economic reality based on several specific
factors and then apply a presumption of sale treatment to cases where the events
occur within a two-year time frame. See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3 (1983) et seq. This
solution was crafted in response to a fairly contentious series of cases in which
the courts had great difficulty fashioning a workable solution under the more
general provision that preceded section 707(a(2)(B). See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt.
2, at 1217-21 (1984).
40.
See Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax, supranote 21, § 26.2663-2(d).
41.
See id. An example of this is when an NRA first transfers U.S. real
estate to a wholly-owned non-U.S. corporation and then transfers the stock.
42.
In commenting on an example like that in the prior footnote, one
article concluded:
It is well known that the situs rules can be circumvented by such a
transfer to a corporation and, if it is the government's objective to close
this gap in the situs rules, it should not do so merely for GSTT purposes.
Further, it should seek to do so by encouraging a legislative change, not
through a regulation.
Richard L. Doemberg & Jeffrey W. Pennell, Application of the Generation-Skipping
Transfer Tax in an International Setting, 6 TAX NOTES INTL 723, 727 (Mar. 22,
1993).
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As compared to business transactions, these transfers are more
readily directed by a single party, the donor. As a result, the
most desirable form of a transaction can be more easily
structured in advance without the need for the kind of "prior
understandings" with other parties that can trigger the
application of the step transaction doctrine. Nevertheless, the
proposed regulation clearly overstepped its statutory boundaries
and would have created a startling exception to the established
principle of limiting taxation to U.S. situs assets.
Similarly, the proposed regulations under section 643(h) go
beyond traditional principles. 4 3 That section provides that "any
amount paid to a United States person which is derived directly
or indirectly from a foreign trust of which the payor is not the
grantor shall be deemed.., to have been directly paid by the

foreign trust to such United States person.""

Under proposed

regulation 1.643(h)-1, any indirect payments made through a
"tainted" intermediary will be "deemed" direct distributions from
the trust to the beneficiary. 4 s The proposed regulation sets forth
three tests to determine when we have a tainted intermediary: the
"tracing" test, the "but for" test, and the "preconceived plan" test.
Under the "tracing" test, an intermediary is tainted if the
intermediary is related to the trust or the beneficiary and the
property received by the beneficiary can be traced to the trust. 4 6
43.
44
45.

See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(h)-1, 62 Fed. Reg. 30790 (June 5, 1997).
I.R.C. § 643(h) (1998).
Proposed regulation section 1.643(h)-i provides:

(a) In general. For purposes of sections 641 through 683, any amount of
property that is derived, directly or indirectly, by a United States person
from a foreign trust through another person (an intermediary) shall be
deemed to have been paid directly by the foreign trust to the United States
person if any one of the following conditions is satisfied(1) The intermediary is related (within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this
section) to either the United States person or the foreign trust and the
intermediary transfers to the United States person either property that the
intermediary received from the foreign trust or proceeds from the property
that the intermediary received from the foreign trust;
(2) The intermediary would not have transferred the property to the
United States person (or would not have transferred the property to the
United States person on substantially the same terms) but for the fact that
the intermediary received property from the foreign trust; or
(3) The intermediary received the property from the foreign trust pursuant
to a plan one of the principal purposes of which was the avoidance of U.S.
tax.
(b) Exceptionfor grantoras intermediary.Paragraph (a) of this section shall
not apply if the intermediary is the grantor of the portion of the trust from
which the amount is derived.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(h)-i, 62 Fed Reg. 30790 (June 5, 1997). For the

definition of grantor, see id. § 1.671-2(e).
46.

See id. § 1.643(h)-l(a)(1).
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Under the "but for" test, an intermediary is tainted if the
intermediary would not have transferred the property to the U.S.
person but for the fact that the intermediary received property
from the trust.4 7 Under the "preconceived plan" test, an
intermediary is tainted if the intermediary received property from
48
the trust pursuant to a plan to avoid U.S. taxes.

Through the proposed regulation, the Service treats a
"tainted" intermediary as a nominee while attributing true
ownership of the property to the trust. Since a nominal owner is
disregarded for tax purposes, this allows the Service to disregard
what purports to be the form of the transaction and to treat the
distribution as a distribution from the trust to the beneficiary.
The broad language used in the statute and proposed regulation
raises the question of whether the Service can treat an
intermediary as a nominee when that intermediary would be
recognized as a true owner under existing common law and
judicial doctrines. The distinction between nominal ownership
and beneficial ownership pervades the tax law, and a substantial
body of common law exists to distinguish between the two. Did
Congress intend to embody these common law principles of
ownership when it enacted section 643(h), or did Congress
instead authorize the Service to disregard a form that has a
substantive basis in common law?
Since Congress did not expressly affirm or deny common law
principles when it enacted this new Code provision, it should be
interpreted under the general rule that federal courts will
interpret federal statutes consistent with existing law, which
includes common law principles. 4 9 The concept of nominal
ownership versus true ownership is implicit in Congress' use of
the word "indirectly" in section 643(h).5 0 The term "indirectly"
has been interpreted to mean "not leading to aim or result by the
plainest course or method or obvious means."5 1 Interpreting
Congress' use of the word "indirectly" in section 643(h) in
conjunction with common law suggests that Congress intended to
embrace common law doctrines that disregard, for tax purposes,
only nominal owners of property.

47.
See id. § 1.643(h)-l(a)(2).
48.
See idL § 1.643(h)-1(a)(3).
49.
See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
50.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3U)(2), (3) ex.3 (1992) (illustrating
"indirect contribution" via a public charity).
51.
Cahen Trust v. United States, 292 F.2d. 33, 36 (7th Cir. 1961)
(interpreting the phrase "paid... indirectly by the decedent").
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The legislative history that accompanied the enactment of

section 643(h) supports this interpretation.

Section 643(h)

replaced section 665(c) 5 2 which provided:
(c) SPECIAL RULE APPLICABLE TO DISTRmIBtONS BY CERTAIN FOREIGN
TRUSTS-For purposes of this subpart, any amount paid to a United
States person which is from a payor who is not a United States
person and which is derived directly or indirectly from a foreign
trust created by a United States person shall be deemed in the year
of payment to have been directly paid by the foreign trust.

The House Committee Report that accompanied the
enactment of section 643(h) and the repeal of section 665(c)
provided:
DISTRIBUTIONS BY FOREIGN TRUSTS THROUGH NOMINEES.-The bill
generally treats any amount paid to a U.S. person, where the
amount was derived (directly or indirectly) from a foreign trust, as if
paid by the foreign trust directly to the U.S. person. This rule
disregards the role of an intermediary or nominee that may be
interposed between a foreign trust and a U.S. beneficiary. Unlike
present law, however, the rule applies whether or not the trust was
created by a U.S. person. The rule does not apply to a withdrawal
from a foreign trust by its grantor, with a subsequent gift or other
53
payment to a U.S. person.

In addition to the legislative history, the General Explanation by
5 4
the Joint Committee provided similar language.
Thus, we look
to existing common law and judicial doctrines to determine
whether the form, disregarded by Service, reflects the substance
(i.e., when an apparent owner will be treated as a nominee).5 5
The owner of property for federal tax purposes is determined
from all the facts and circumstances. 56 Courts look to beneficial
ownership, as opposed to mere legal title, to identify the owner of
property.5 7 The hallmarks of beneficial enjoyment include
command over the property or the enjoyment of its economic

52.
I.R.C. § 665(c), repealed by the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1904(c)(2), 110 Stat. 1755, 1912.
53.
H.R. REP. No. 104-542 (II), pt. 2, at 79, availablein 1996 WL 226929.
54.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 268, 271 (J.
Comm. Print 1996).
55.
A similar analysis should apply under § 672(f)(5) addressing so-called
"give and go" arrangements. See I.R.C. § 672(f)(5) (Supp. I 1996) (amending I.R.C.
§ 672(f) (1994)). Note, however, that section 672(fi)(5) is a much more
circumscribed rule and will actually apply in a larger percentage of cases in which
it presumptively applies. Id.
56.
See Hang v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 74, 80 (1990) (citing Schoenberg v.
Commissioner, 302 F.2d 416, 419 (8th Cir. 1962) (beneficial owners of stock
subject to tax on corporate distributions)).
57.
See Serianni v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1090, 1104 (1983), affd, 765
F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that beneficial owner, rather than nominal
owner, of a certificate of deposit was liable for tax).
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benefits.5 8 When beneficial ownership does not coincide with
nominal ownership, courts have used the step transaction
doctrine and substance-over-form principle to disregard the
nominal owner for tax purposes. For example, in Heyen v. United
States 9 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals used the substanceover-form principle to disregard transfers to intermediaries. The
court concluded:
The evidence at trial indicated decedent intended to transfer the
stock to her family rather than to the intermediate recipients. The
intermediary recipients only received the stock certificates and
signed them in blank so that the stock could be reissued to a
member of decedent's family.
Decedent merely used those
recipients to create gift tax exclusions to avoid paying gift tax on
indirect gifts to the actual family member beneficiaries.

Courts have disregarded the form of the transaction in other
contexts as well. 60 These common law and judicial doctrines
should be used to decide whether the application of proposed
regulation section 1.643(h)-l(a) in a specific circumstance is
6
valid. 1
Thus, the proposed regulation should be valid only to the

extent that it is applied by the Service within these existing
common law and judicial doctrines. Generally speaking, the third
test under the proposed regulation, the "preconceived plan," is
likely to be sustained since it is arguably nothing more than a
restatement of the step transaction doctrine. However, the second
test is more troublesome. Whether a particular application of the
proposed regulation goes beyond existing law must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. The "but for" test can be properly

58.
See Buhl v. Kavanaugh, 118 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1941); Hang, 95
T.C. at 80 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 870, 873 (7th Cir.

1947)).
59.
60.

945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991).
See United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969) (holding

that the value of reciprocal trust established by spouse is included in decedent's
gross estate); Schultz v. United States, 493 F.2d 1225, 1226 (4th Cir. 1974)
(holding that the gifts to children of reciprocal donors treated as gifts to children
of donor); Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710, 712 (2d Cir. 1936) (noting that
the question in such circumstances is "whether the transaction ... is in reality
what it appears to be in form" and rejecting intermediary "gift" as sham); Bixby v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 791 (1972) (disregarding nominal grantor).
61.
Courts have traditionally shown the greatest amount of deference to a
legislative regulation. See Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252 (1981).
The most recent formulation of the standard of review is the reasonableness
standard articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 866 (1978) and its progeny. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co.
v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998); Estate of Millikin v.
Commissioner, 125 F.3d 339, 343 (1997). A regulation may be unreasonable and

held invalid where the regulation attempts to tax income that would otherwise not
be taxed. See Weidenhoff, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1222, 1242 (1959).
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applied to disregard a disinterested intermediary such as a
corporate trustee. Funds are not taxable to an entity that acts
merely as a custodian.6 2 Factors that may indicate that an
intermediary is serving as a mere conduit or as a repository of
funds include lack of discretion over the use of the funds, no
independent reason for receiving the funds transferred from a
foreign trust, and the entity is not related to the grantor or
beneficiary.6 3 However, the "but for" test must require in other
cases some showing of intent, i.e., some evidence of
prearrangement. To take a simple case, it would be a substantial
extension of the law to treat an impecunious NRA as a mere
"intermediary" on the ground that he was able to make a gift to

his deserving U.S. nephew only because the NRA received a
distribution from a non-U.S. trust that made him rich. While
these facts would literally meet the "but for" test in the proposed
regulations, they could not have been intended to be within the
scope of the statute. A simplification may be to eliminate the
"but for" test as a separate test and incorporate it into the

"preconceived plan" test. This would not narrow the scope of

regulation since those cases within the scope of the "but for" test
would likely come within the "preconceived plan" test as well.
The "tracing test" is the most troubling of the three tests for a
tainted intermediary. For example, if mother receives a French
Chateau from foreign trust and then twenty-five years later leaves the
Chateau to son upon her death, mother is a tainted intermediary
under the tracing test and son is to be treated as if he received a
direct distribution from the trust. A literal application of the proposed
regulation dictates this absurd result. in these circumstances, the
son would have a strong argument that mother's ownership of the
property eliminates any nexus between the trust and the property.
As noted earlier, the mother's "dominion and control" over the
property is enough to dispel the notion that this is a "step
transaction" under existing law.
There will be many other circumstances where the "tracing
test" can be applied to disregard related intermediaries that act
as nominees. In the example above, if mother owned the French
Chateau for twenty-four hours prior to the transfer to son, then
the transfer to son likely would be deemed a direct transfer from
the trust to son under the proposed regulation. This application

62.

See, e.g., Illinois Power Co. v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683, 689 (7th

Cir. 1986) (public utility did not recognize income when
"custodian").
63.

it held receipts as

For a discussion of relevant factors, see COMM. ON ESTATES AND TRUSTS,

TAX SECTION, NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, COMMENTS ON NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS

UNDER SECTIONS 643(a), 671 AND 672() OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 4-6, Dec. 4,

1997, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
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of the proposed regulation should be upheld if mother serves as a
mere nominee.
No doubt some taxpayers will attempt to avoid the reach of
section 643(h) altogether by using the grantor as the intermediary
between the foreign trust and the beneficiary. Under the language
of the statute, the payment will not be deemed to have been
directly paid by the foreign trust to the U.S. person if the grantor
is the payor. Yet, the Service should also be free to show that the
grantor is a mere nominee under the analysis discussed above. If
the common law and judicial doctrines suggest that the grantor is
merely a nominal payor of money or property earlier distributed
from the trust, then the beneficiary should be treated as receiving
a distribution from the trust.
In this kind of analysis, the review of common law and
judicial doctrines is not merely an academic exercise. The
common law provides the substance by which the form is
examined, but the form is the first point of departure in the
analysis. If and when the form no longer reflects the substance,
the courts generally will follow the substance. However, this is

not a license to disregard the form of a transaction simply
because the statutory scheme has proven by experience to be
ineffective or incomplete. Indeed, there may be cases in which no
legislative purpose is apparent for requiring a particular form.
The next step is not to effectively rewrite the statute but rather to
conclude that the literal form alone is controlling. For example,
in

Helvering. v.

Southwest Consolidated Corp., the

Court

concluded that the requirement under section 368(b)(1)(B) of an
exchange 'solely" for voting stock left "no leeway" so that adding
any other consideration in the exchange, however modest,
violated the statutory requirement."
Having illustrated how the U.S. tax system relies on form,
and respects form as a reflection of substance, this Article will
now examine how this principle can be further applied to the
income taxation of non-U.S. trusts, and in particular, to trusts
holding investment companies.

III. TRUSTS

HOLDING INVESTMENT COMPANIES

A. Taxation of Trusts
A non-grantor trust that is not resident in the United States
for income tax purposes (a "foreign trust") is nevertheless

64.

315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942).
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governed by the same basic "distributable net income" (DNI)
regime as domestic trusts when it makes a distribution. The
trust will be regarded for federal income tax purposes as a mere
"conduit," to the extent the foreign trust distributes (or is deemed
to distribute) only amounts attributable to its DNI for the current
tax year.6 5 The tax treatment therefore will "flow through" to the
beneficiaries, and the beneficiary will be taxed in roughly the
same manner as if he had earned that "distributed" income
directly. 66 This is the "traditional" rule for DNI, as defined in
section 643, which is roughly equivalent to the trust's net
ordinary income, capital gains if currently paid or payable, and
other taxable income, as determined under U.S. income tax
principles.
There are, however, a number of special rules that apply to
distributions by aforeignnon-grantor trust to a U.S. beneficiary if
the trust has accumulated income. These rules basically levy an
income tax at ordinary income tax rates, plus an interest charge
on this tax that was previously deferred, to the extent there is an
"accumulation distribution." An "accumulation distribution" will
occur whenever two conditions are satisfied: (a) distributions for
the year exceed the current year's income (as measured for both
income tax purposes and accounting purposes), and (b) there is

undistributed net income (UNI) in the trust from prior years,
including undistributedcapital gains.67 This is the same principle
in 1997 of the
that applied to U.S. trusts prior to the 6repeal
8
"throwback rule" for most domestic trusts.
An accumulation distribution from a foreign trust can have
serious adverse tax implications to a U.S. beneficiary. Since the
foreign trust is not taxed currently by the United States on its net
worldwide income (section 641(b)), the Code provides that U.S.
beneficiaries will be taxed upon later accumulation distributions
on a worldwide basis. Furthermore, a distribution of more than
the current year's income is almost certain to include an
accumulation distribution because in calculating UNI, "income"
includes foreign-source income even though such income is not
taxable to the trust because it is not resident in the United

See I.R.C. § 651(b) (1994) (limiting deduction to amount of DNI for the
65.
taxable year).
66.
Id. § 652 (requiring that the amount of income for the taxable year that
is required to be distributed by a trust under section 651 shall "be included in the
gross income of the beneficiaries to whom the income is required to be
distributed").
Id. §§ 643(b) (defining "income" for the subpart), 665(b) (defining
67.
"accumulation distribution"), 666(a).

68.

See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 507(a)(1) 111

Stat. 856 (amending section 665 by inserting a new subsection (c)).
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States. 6 9 Capital gains also are taxed adversely when
accumulated and later distributed from the foreign trusts. They
are added to UNI in foreign trusts, and the substantially lower
effective U.S. income tax rate on long-term capital gains (20
percent) as compared to ordinary income (e.g., 39.6 percent) is
lost because such accumulation distributions from a foreign trust
are all taxed as ordinary income.7 0 Finally, the trust may have
expenses that are not deductible against income under U.S. tax
law (e.g., expenses of maintaining a personal residence). Thus,
income that is not taxable to the foreign trust, but that is taxable
to the U.S. beneficiaries and not used for expenses that are
deductibleto the trust, will be considered UNI for this purpose.
Prior to 1996, an accumulation distribution was taxed at the
U.S. beneficiaries' average marginal tax rate for the prior five
years, plus interest.7 1 Interest was computed at a fixed annual
rate of six percent, with no compounding.7 2 When an
accumulation distribution involved amounts accumulated in
more than one year, the deferral period for the six percent charge
was the average number of years of deferral, but the average was
not weighted to take into account the amount of the distribution
from each year.7 3 As a result, the effective interest charge could
be manipulated by creating small accumulations in a year shortly
before a distribution to offset very large accumulations dating
back several years. The ability to manipulate the interest charge
ended in 1996.
In 1996, Congress provided for a nondeductible compound
interest charge applied to the amount of tax that was effectively
deferred during the time that the beneficiary receiving the
distribution was a U.S. person (regardless of the beneficiary's
age). The interest rate is six percent per year for distributions
from accumulations attributed to the period prior to 1996, and
that rate is applied on a compound basis as of January 1, 1996.

For income earned and accumulated thereafter, the varying rate
74
for tax underpayments applies.

69.
70.
71.
72.
Protection

73.

See I.R.C. § 643(a)(6).
See id. §§ 643(a)(6), 667(e).
See id. §§ 666, 667(a) (referring to § 668 for the amount of interest).
See id. § 668(a), prior to its amendment in the Small Business Job
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 1906(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1914.

See id.

74.
See i. §§ 665(b) (defining "accumulation distribution"), 667(a)(3), 668,
6621(a)(2) (explaining that the determination of interest rates is the rate
applicable to underpayments of tax).
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B. Taxation of ForeignInvestment Companies
Several special U.S. tax provisions address ownership in
non-U.S. corporations by U.S. persons, particularly investment
companies or companies in a tax haven. Since the U.S. generally
does not tax non-U.S. corporations on foreign-source income,
these special U.S. tax rules are designed to prevent U.S. persons
from using non-U.S. corporations to avoid tax by accumulating
income offshore. These rules are principally, though not entirely,
directed at the passive investment assets of non-U.S.
corporations that are controlled by U.S. persons. The impact of
these rules can be particularly disruptive if, for example, a
non-U.S. trust in a tax haven jurisdiction owns one or more such
passive investment corporations, and the trust has one or more
U.S. beneficiaries governed by these rules.
The controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules require closely
held U.S. ownership of the stock, but include corporations with a
much wider variety of assets and activities than the foreign personal
holding company (FPHC) rules.
In broad outline,' a foreign
corporation is a CFC if more than fifty percent of its stock, by value
or vote, is owned directly or indirectly by U.S. shareholders who, for
CFC purposes, hold ten percent or more of the company's stock by
vote. 75 Such a U.S. shareholder of a CFC must include in his own
income the pro rata share of the CFC's income, including
"Subpart F income" (which in turn includes FPHC income with
certain modifications, and sales and services income derived from
transactions with related parties) and certain other items, (such as
any increase in the company's earnings invested in U.S. property).7 6
Such U.S. shareholders are generally not simultaneously subject to
77
the passive foreign investment company rules on the same stock.
Under the FPHC rules, an individual who becomes a U.S.
resident and continues to own stock in a FPHC will be taxed as if
a dividend equal to his pro rata share of undistributed FPHC
income had been paid to him. For this purpose, FPHC income is
essentially undistributed income, and income that is paid to a
foreign intermediary such as a foreign non-grantor trust.7 8
Losses are not similarly passed out to the shareholder, so there is
no netting of entity level results if the U.S. shareholder owns

75.
See generally id. § 957 (delineating what constitutes a CFC).
76.
See id. § 951 (Supp. II 1996).
77.
See id. § 1296, amended by § 1121 of Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-34.
78.
See id. § 551(a), (1). In addition, a gain on the disposition of shares by
U.S. shareholders is taxed as a dividend rather than as capital gain. See I.R.C.
§ 1248(a) (Supp. I 1996).
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stock in more than one FPHC. An FPHC generally means a
foreign corporation (i.e., non-U.S.) in which more than fifty
percent of the stock, by value or vote, is owned by five or fewer
U.S. citizens or residents, after applying attribution rules, and

whose income is at least sixty percent attributable to interest,
dividends, rents, royalties, stock or securities gains, and similar
passive income (reduced to fifty percent once the corporation
79
becomes a FPHC).
Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA 1984), it
was possible to take the position that FPHC treatment did not
apply if the shareholder of the investment company was a nonU.S. trust, even if the trust had U.S. beneficiaries. The U.S.
taxpayer, as beneficiary of the trust, arguably would be insulated
from current taxation under the FPHC rules.8 0 In DEFRA 1984,
Congress eliminated this result when it passed a rule that
attributed stock of a foreign investment company owned by a
foreign trust directly to the beneficiaries of the trust.8 1 Shortly
thereafter Congress further clarified the law by dealing with
dividends paid by the investment company to the trust. The
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA 1988)
provided that distributionsto an intervening foreign trust owning
stock in the FPHC would be treated as distributions to the trust's
82
beneficiaries.
In this same time frame, Congress also addressed the broader
issue of investments by U.S. taxpayers in a foreign investment
company with fifty percent or less U.S. ownership. Investments in
offshore mutual funds had been actively marketed in the U.S. as a
tax-deferred investment since the FPHC and CFC rules did not
apply due to the lack of control by U.S. persons. This changed with
the passage of the passive foreign investment company (PFIC) rules
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. A PFIC is characterized by a passive
income/assets test (very differently defined than in the FPHC rules),
but the stock ownership can be closely or widely held and the
percentage of U.S. ownership is irrelevant. Unlike the FPHC, there
is no automatic "deemed distribution," but a U.S. shareholder of a
PFIC, such as a foreign mutual fund, must now choose among
unappealing alternatives: (i) current inclusion in income of the U.S.
shareholder's pro rata share of current ordinary income and capital
gains of the PFIC pursuant to a shareholder election (a so-called
"qualified electing fund" or "QEF" election), 83 (ii) a new "mark-to-

79.
See id. § 552.
80.
See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1535 (1984).
81.
See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 666.
82.
See S. REP. No. 100-445, at 329-30 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 99426, at 932 (1985).
83.
See I.R.C. § 1295 (1994).
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market" election for marketable PFIC securities where gain is taxed
annually at ordinary income rates,8 4 or (iii) upon a sale of the PFIC
stock (or certain special distributions to the shareholders), the
imposition of ordinary income tax treatment and an interest
charge.8 5 Importantly, the interest charge is calculated on certain
assumptions that are purportedly designed to estimate the deferral
of U.S. tax on undistributed gains and income but seem instead to
assume the greatest possible deferral and corresponding interest
charge by treating the gain as earned equally over the deferral
period.

IV. ATTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT COMPANY STOCK

TO U.S. BENEFICIARIES
In each of these offshore investment company provisions,
Congress addressed ownership by foreign trusts. The FPHC, CFC,
and PFIC rules all attribute stock owned by a trust to the beneficial
owners of the trust. When such an investment company is held by a
non-U.S., non-grantor trust, the rule makes the trust transparent, so
that income is includabe and taxable to the U.S. benefianj as if the
stock were owned directly.8 6 This is very problematic. For example,
distributions from the trust may be needed by the U.S. beneficiary to
pay the resulting taxes. These tax payments to the U.S. Government,
and related reporting of information on the trust and the underlying
corporation, can be disruptive to the confidentiality concerns of other
branches of the family who may not have any similar obligation. Also,
even if no distributions are required, a detailed information return
may still be required by these foreign corporation rules. Yet, this rule
clearly applies even if no U.S. resident ever personally made a transfer
to the trust, and if taken literally, it applies to a U.S. beneficiary who
has no clearly-enforceable right to trust distributions.
A. Attributionfor Testing Status, and Including Income
The context of this trust attribution to beneficiaries is a very
comprehensive statutory scheme. The CFC and FPHC rules have
broad and detailed provisions attributing ownership among
family members and to and from entities (trusts, corporations,
partnerships) in order to test for CFC or FPHC status.
Attribution for income inclusion purposes is much more limited,
84.

See id. § 1296, amended by § 1122 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,

Pub. L, No. 105-34.
85.
See I.R.C. § 1291.
86.
See id. §§ 551(),
amended in 1983).

958(a)(2),

1298(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.951-1

(as
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but ownership by foreign entities generally cannot be used to
shield the U.S. shareholder from having to include FPHC or CFC
income in his personal income tax obligation. As indicated below,
if a trust owns the shares, the Code provides that this ownership
can be attributed to U.S. beneficiaries for all purposes.
Unlike the CFC rules regarding family attribution and
attribution to entities under section 958(b), the FPHC rules will
actually attribute the share ownership of a non-U.S, shareholder
to a U.S. shareholder in determining whether the company meets
the closely held U.S. ownership test. The only limit is that stock
owned by an NRA is still not attributed to a U.S. family member
(other than a spouse) who does not otherwise own any stock at
87
all, in fact or through non-family attribution.
Because closely held ownership or U.S. control is irrelevant
for defining a PFIC, attribution of ownership is generally not as
important. However, the PFIC attribution rules s do attribute
ownership of PFIC stock held by an entity to the owner of the
entity, proportionately, through multiple tiers, in order to impute
ownership to a U.S. person for purposes of applying the
alternative taxing regimes.8 9
As applied to shares held by a foreign non-grantor trust, the
PFIC attribution rules and related provisions in section 1298 can
be inexplicably harsh. The PFIC regime ordinarily does not cause
phantom income in the absence of a cashless disposition of
stock.90 There is no automatic deemed distribution to the
shareholder, which is consistent with the concept that closely
held ownership or U.S. control is irrelevant for defining a PFIC.
However, a U.S. beneficiary could be attributed ownership of the
PFIC stock owned by a foreign trust, and can then be attributed
phantom income when the PFIC pays a dividend to the trust if
section 1298(b)(5) is applied literally. The beneficiary could be
charged with income as if the beneficiary had actually received
from the PFIC the portion of the dividend attributed to the
beneficiary from the trust, even though the beneficiary may not
actually be receiving any comparable distributions from the trust.
The result is quite different than the treatment of a U.S.
beneficiary whose beneficial interest in a foreign non-grantor

87.

See I.R.C. § 554(c) (1994).

88.
See icL§ 1298.
89.
In addition, when the PFIC rules measure the critical time period for
computing the tax deferral and the related interest charge, sections 1291(a)(3) and
1223(2) provide for "tacldng" if the transferor passed on a carry-over basis. Thus,
a transfer by gift (or bequest, section 1291(e)) from one generation to the next will
not purge the taint of the deferred tax and accumulating interest charge due on
sale by an ultimate U.S. resident or citizen owner.
90.
Prop. Reg. 1.1291-3(b).
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trust is swelling with income accumulated from other sources
(e.g., not investment companies, but, say, investment
partnerships).
This result is also quite different from the
treatment of an outright U.S. owner of PFIC shares. These
persons are generally free of U.S. tax liability on the income until
it is received.
B. Allocation to Beneficiaries
Despite the fact that trust attribution to beneficiaries has
been part of the Code now for over ten years, the application of
the rule remains unclear. In each part of the FPHC, CFC, and
PFIC regime, the statute calls for the stock to be attributed
"proportionately" to the beneficiaries. This begs the obvious
question: in proportion to what? Regulatory guidance has been
long delayed. Sometimes the existing regulations refer again to
attributing ownership to the beneficiaries "proportionately,"
without defining the term.9 1
The most difficult issue is determining whether a U.S.
beneficiary of a foreign non-grantor trust will be subject to
current taxation on "phantom" income under the FPHC, PFIC, or
CFC antideferral regimes. The issue is made especially difficult
because, as indicated above, there is a risk that taxable income
may be allocated to trust beneficiaries who are not receiving it
currently and may never receive it, especially in view of the fact
that beneficial interests in the customary offshore trust are
largely indeterminate, since the trust language usually follows the
British tradition of granting enormous discretion to the trustee
over distributions.
The answer depends on the method of stock attribution
under those sections. Arguably, one of three stock attribution
methods will be used to attribute stock of a foreign corporation
owned by a foreign trust to the trust beneficiaries: (1) actuarial,
(2) pure current distributions, or (3) facts and circumstances.
1. Actuarial

Stock held in a non-grantor trust may be allocated to
beneficiaries in proportion to the beneficiaries' actuarial interest
in the trust. Under both the foreign and domestic personal
holding company rules, stock owned by a trust is considered as
91.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.958-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1983); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.958-2(c)(1)(ii)(a); see also Rev. Rul. 90-106, 1990-2 C.B. 162 (grantor trust);
Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.1291-1(b)(8) pmbl. of Apr. 1, 1992 (suggestion to define
"proportionate" for PFIC purposes by reference to the attribution rules in Treas.
Reg. § 25.2701-6 concerning estate freezes).
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owned proportionately by its beneficiaries. 92 The Service has
concluded that the term beneficiary, under section 544 of the
domestic personal holding company rules, has the same meaning
as in section 318. 9 3 Under section 318, stock is attributed to
trust beneficiaries in proportion to their actuarial interest in the
trust.9 4

The actuarial method, however, has not been used to

allocate stock from a trust in which the beneficiaries have a
discretionary interest rather than a specifically definable interest.
Under these circumstances, the Service has either allocated in
proportion to current distributions or under a facts and
circumstances test.
2. Pure Current Distributions
Stock held in a foreign trust also may be allocated in proportion
to current distributions from the trust. In Stueben Securities Corp. v.
Commissioner,the taxpayer attempted to avoid the domestic personal
holding company rules through the use of trusts with present and
future interests such that no five or fewer individuals owned more
than fifty percent of the outstanding shares. 9 s The Tax Court
concluded that beneficiaries for purposes of the domestic holding
company provision "means those who have a direct present interest in
the shares and income in the taxable year and not those whose
interest, whether vested or contingent, will or may become effective at
a later time."9 6 Thus, the court refused to take an actuarial approach
even where the future interest was vested and was subject to
actuarial valuation. Although no other courts have applied the "pure"
present interest test used by the Tax Court in Slueben, the facts and

circumstances test sometimes leads to the same result.
3. Facts and Circumstances
Stock held in a foreign trust may be allocated to the trust
beneficiaries using a facts and circumstances test. Under this
test, relevant factors would include any pattern of past
distributions, appropriate mortality assumptions, the trustee's
fiduciary duties, and the relationships among the trustee and the

92.
See I.R.C. §§ 544(a)(1), 554(a)(1) (1994).
93.
See Rev. Rul. 71-353, 1971-2 C.B. 243.
94.
See I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B); see also Rev. Rul. 62-155, 1962-2 C.B. 132
(stock attributed to beneficiaries in proportion to actuarial interest); Phinney v.
Tuboscope Co., 268 F.2d 233 (1959) (children were beneficiaries even though
Trustee could postpone all distributions until child reached age 21).
95.
See 1 T.C. 395, 399 (1943).
96.
Id.
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beneficiaries. 97 In Private Letter Ruling 90-24-076, the Service
addressed the issue of how to determine a beneficiary's actuarial

interest in an irrevocable trust, for purposes of section 542(a), the
personal holding company provision, where the trustees had the
complete discretion to distribute income and principal from the
trust.9 8 The Service determined that stock owned by the trust
should be attributed to the trust beneficiaries based on the
pattern of actual distributions from the trust.
Because in that ruling the trustees had unrestricted
discretion in selecting the recipients of the income and principal,
the trust's beneficiaries did not have an actuarial interest in the
trust that could be computed pursuant to the guidelines
contained in Revenue Ruling 62-15599 and Treasury Regulation
section 1.318-3(b).1 00 As a result, the Service relied upon a "facts
and circumstances" method of attributing ownership of the
trust's stock to the beneficiaries and examined the "pattern of
past distributions" from the trust. The pattern of distributions
from the trust indicated that three of settlor's children (and their
respective lineal descendants) had been receiving one hundred
percent of the trust's income. The Service concluded that "[e]ach
beneficiary receiving distributions under the pattern will be
considered to own an income interest in the trust in the same
proportion that the amount of distributions he receives bears to
10 1
the total amount of the distributions."
4. Uncertain Results
A simple example illustrates the difficulty in applying this

authority to foreign trusts that own a foreign investment
company. Assume that a U.S. taxpayer is the income beneficiary
of foreign trust, and the remainder passes to an NRA in ten years.
Furthermore, assume for simplicity that the NRA is unrelated to
the U.S. taxpayer (e.g., the NRA is a charity). The income
beneficiary is to receive the first $100,000 of the trust's income,
and the additional income must be accumulated. Now, what if
the investment company earns $2 million of income per year? Is
the investment company an FPHC? Should the answer change if
the investment company earns $200,000 of income per year? In
the first scenario, the value of the remainder exceeds the value of

97.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-24-076 (Mar. 21, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-48-043
(Sept. 1, 1987).
98.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-24-076, supranote 97.
99.
Rev. Rul. 62-155, 1962-2 C.B. 132.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(b).
101.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-24-076, supra note 97.
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the income interest; yet, it is unclear how this affects attribution
of the stock.
Under the actuarial method of allocation, the investment
company is not an FPHC if the investment company earns $2
million of income, since the majority of the stock would be
attributed to the NRA remainderman. Thus, the U.S. beneficiary
would be subject to the PFIC rules but not the FPHC rules.
Under the pure current distribution method of allocation, the
investment company is an FPHC under both the $2 million and
the $200,000 scenarios, since all the current distributions are to
the U.S. person. Thus, the U.S. beneficiary would be subject to
current taxation on $100,000 under the FPHC regime.
Next, consider the same trust with an unrelated NRA income
beneficiary and a U.S. remainderman. Under the actuarial
method, the investment company is an FPHC if the investment
company earns $2 million of income, since the majority of the
stock would be attributed to the U.S. remainderman. Thus, the
U.S. remainderman would be subject to current taxation under
the FPHC rules, even though the trustee could not make a
distribution to the U.S. remainderman and therefore cannot
convert a "deemed dividend" into a real dividend. But if the
investment "pie" is smaller, the NRA's share is bigger, and the
FPHC status may disappear. The investment company would not
be an FPHC under the $200,000 income scenario or under the
current distributions allocation method. 1°2
The example illustrates why there is no mechanical, or
predictable, solution to these attribution questions. Indeed, a
mechanical application of the actuarial or pure distribution
methods would likely lead to unintended results in many cases.
Furthermore, there is no accepted manner of applying these
methods of attribution to purely discretionary foreign trusts or to
many other cases that are much more complicated and common
than our simple example. Given the difficulty in applying the
actuarial and pure distribution allocation methods, it seems
logical to consider seriously the merits of the facts and
circumstances method of attribution. In applying this approach,
distribution patterns and actuarial values would still be taken
into account, but language in the trust instrument, and
reasonable growth projections should also be considered relevant
factors. As a result, the system would still fail to achieve
predictable results.

102. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-48-043, supra note 97, in which a corporation
was held in usufruct, and the Service ruled that the most relevant beneficial
interest was trust income, not corpus.
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C. Failureto Respect the Trust Fonn
The broader question raised by the difficulty of applying the
rule of attribution to trust beneficiaries is whether the rule
should be applied at all. Did Congress make a sound decision
when it concluded that the FPHC and the CFC regimes, and the
later enacted PFIC provisions, should be applied to U.S.
beneficiaries of a non-U.S. trust as if their "proportionate"
beneficial interest in the trust represented their share of the
trust's stockholdings?
One perspective would suggest that this result is necessary
to maintain the integrity of a system designed to combat offshore
deferral of income taxes. Without it, the trust would appear to
shield U.S. taxpayers from the effect of these rules and permit
deferral. At least when the attribution rule for trusts holding
investment companies was enacted in the mid-1980s, the deferral
rules that applied to trusts alone were only modestly restrictive,
as discussed earlier. The rules provided for only a six percent
simple interest charge on the deferred tax that came due when
the accumulations were later paid to U.S. beneficiaries, and a
computational formula that was somewhat vulnerable to
10 3
manipulation.
Despite this undeniable hole in the defenses against offshore

deferral, the step taken by Congress in adopting the trust
attribution rule for investment companies was the wrong step.
Attributing the stock to the trust beneficiaries as if they are
shareholders violates the principle of respecting form and
recognizing that form reflects substance.
While it may be
prudent to apply such an attribution rule for testing whether the
investment company is owned by U.S. persons for some
purposes, it is unrealistic to impute income to a U.S. beneficiary
of a foreign trust by a mechanical attribution rule that purports
to treat the beneficiary as if the shareholder rights held by the
trustee are held by the beneficiary.
The corporation pays
dividends to the trustee, not to the beneficiary. The corporation
recognizes the voting rights of the trustee, not the beneficiary.
The existence of the form of the trust cannot be prudently
legislated out of existence, as if all trustees were agents of the
beneficiaries. A rule of form should not broadly destroy
substance.

103. In addition, it was sometimes argued that migration of the trust to the
United States prior to the accumulation distribution could be considered as
cleansing the later accumulation distribution of its offshore character, based on
the language of the statute. While the Service ruled against this reading of the
statute in 1991, it was not until 1997 that the statute was amended to preclude
that conclusion. See I.R.C. § 665(c); Rev. Rul. 91-6, 1991-1 C.B. 89.
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Trustees serve a substantive function under the trust form.
The trust form is designed for the preservation of property by the
trustee to aid the beneficiaries. The beneficiary is not a
shareholder in the investment company. The beneficiary's role is
quite different than that of an investor. In the typical trust, the
beneficiary does not purchase his interest, does not have the
opportunity to sell the interest, and may have little or no voice in
who manages the trust. The trustee's decision on distributions is
required by prevailing trust law to take into account the purposes
of the trust, which ordinarily considers the needs of each of the

beneficiaries. Distributions may vary in timing and amount over
the course of time and depend upon events such as births and
deaths, as well as family needs that bear little resemblance to a
dividend policy for an investment company.
The anomalies presented by applying an attribution rule tied
to actuarial value or current distributions point out a special
characteristic of the trust form. Its inherent flexibility defies
categorization as a means of parceling out corporate stock under
the attribution rules for foreign corporations. The owner of the
legal title in the trust form is clear: the trustee. But the beneficial
owner is usually a class of owners whose composition and "share"
changes with time and circumstances and the trustee's
judgment. The fact that one-half of current income is distributed
to Smith today tells us nothing about who will receive the second
half that is accumulated; it may be Smith, or Smith's child, or
Smith's uncle, or the deceased grantor's favorite charity. In a socalled "sprinkling" trust, Smith may receive a distribution today,
and yet Jones will receive tomorrow's distribution. In still other
cases where there may be only one beneficiary alive and none
visible on the horizon, income may nevertheless be regularly
accumulated in the Trustee's discretion to hold for unborn future
generations. The seat occupied by the current beneficiary may
have been provided simply to respect the family hierarchy, or to
provide for a living person to oversee the trustee's management,
or to cover some extraordinary emergency that is never likely to
occur. How, in any of these cases, does one evaluate the interest
of unborn beneficiaries? Are they presumptively U.S. persons or
non-U.S. persons?
Another more fundamental question is whether the trustee's

decision to accumulate income is presumed to be tax-motivated,
either in all cases, or unless other legitimate purposes are
demonstrated? If so, then the trust form is being ignored. If
Congress actually intended to enact an automatic attribution
rule, that decision can be justified only by the categorical
assumption that the trust form can be broadly ignored without
practical, non-tax consequences. This means in turn that all
foreign trusts are assumed to be pure tax avoidance devices,
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managed by a collusive or compliant trustee. That view of the
statute therefore seems to impute to Congress an unreasonable
and extreme conclusion. 1°4
Alternatively, then, we might decide that the attribution rule
should not be applied so broadly, or so automatically. But how
would such a system be devised by regulation? The attribution
rule could be applied to trusts in which the discretion of the
trustee is very limited and the beneficial interests so clearly
ascertainable that the trust is, for all practicable purposes,
transparent. That is, however, only a small universe of cases.
This leads to the further conclusion that the attribution rule has
to be applied based on a facts and circumstances determination
of the beneficial interest in each case. Yet that seems the
antithesis of an attribution rule, and the factual inquiry would

necessarily require a thorough examination of governing trust law
and corporate law in almost every case. That process would be
difficult enough if it were Delaware law at issue.1 0 5 Applying
non-U.S. trust law and non-U.S. corporate law would be much
more cumbersome.1 0 6 Assessing the element of tax avoidance
motivation in the structure in order to test the bona fide nature of
the trustee's role would further add to the burden of the
inquiry.1 0 7 The search for a satisfactory system seems fruitless.
A far better solution to this dilemma would have been for
Congress to avoid it in the first instance. It could have taken the
path of completely revising the tax treatment of accumulations in
foreign trusts and avoided adopting the attribution rule for trusts
holding offshore corporations. This approach, which would rely
on adverse tax treatment for trust accumulations, places the tax
burden at the trust level, where the trustee can more directly
address the impact on U.S. beneficiaries of a later distribution.
This approach appropriately precludes the possibility of the
imposition of tax liability on a beneficiary for income that may
never be distributed to or otherwise nrich that person. It also
harmonizes the treatment of beneficiaries of trusts that hold their
assets through investment companies with beneficiaries of trusts
that do not use such companies. This approach allows the tax
law to respect the form, and to appreciate that the trust form
104.

This result would seem especially odd in the context of the new rules

for determining whether a trust is a U.S. resident. A trust could be a "foreign
trust" even if substantial decision-making powers are vested in a U.S.-based
institutional trustee that is governed by its local trust law that clearly requires the
trustee to be a fiduciary and not an agent of the beneficiary. Reg. § 301.7701-7(a).
105. See Alumax Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 822 (11th Cir. 1999), affJg
109 T.C. 177 (1997).
106. See Estate of Oei Tjong Swan v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 247 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1957).
107. See, e.g., Barnett v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 190 (1965).
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reflects substance. The trust form simply cannot be squared with
the view that the "true" shareholder of the offshore corporation is
the beneficiary and that the trust is a mere agency of tax
avoidance.
Now that Congress has in fact dramatically tightened the
trust rules in the 1996 changes noted above, it would be fruitful
to make an effort to harmonize the investment company and trust
accumulation regimes by developing a thoughtful application of

the Code's attribution rules. If creative solutions are not
employed, then a broad application of the attribution rules will
lead to a "Man Bites Dog" result-a rule of form will
destroy the
10 s
substance of U.S. taxation of international trusts.

108. For example, the "phantom income" result under section 1298(b)(5),
see supra Part IV.A., is not inevitable. The regulations under the PFIC rules and
the trust accumulation rules could be written to permit a distribution from a PFIC
to a non-U.S. trust to be taxed only upon a later distribution from the trust to a
U.S. person. The PFIC interest charge could be applied for the PFIC deferral
period and the interest charge on trust accumulations applied to the later trust
accumulation period. Using this approach, the phantom income result described
would be avoided, while still maintaining the integrity of both anti-deferral
regimes.
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